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A B S T R A C T   
Energy Systems Integration (ESI) is an emerging paradigm and at the centre of the EU energy debate. ESI takes a 
holistic view of the electricity, gas, and heat sectors to deliver a clean, reliable, and affordable energy system. By 
using the synergies within and between sectors, ESI aims to increase flexibility in the energy system, maximise 
the integration of renewable energy and distributed generation, and reduce environmental impact. While ESI- 
enabling technologies have been studied from a technical perspective, the economic, regulatory, and policy 
dimensions of ESI are yet to be analysed in depth. This paper discusses ESI in a multi-step approach. We first 
focus on the economics of ESI-enabling technologies. Then we briefly discuss how the EU national regulators 
incentivise their adoption. Major economic and policy barriers to ESI are identified and policy solutions to 
overcome these barriers are proposed. We conclude that current regulatory frameworks in the EU do not suf-
ficiently stimulate ESI investments and only through proper design of incentives ESI can be adopted.   
1. Introduction 
Climate change concerns are transforming the energy industry from 
technical, economic, and political viewpoints. For centuries, fossil fuels 
have been the main sources of energy due to cost advantage and high 
energy contents. The energy and transportation sectors have mostly 
depended on fossil fuels, accounting for two-thirds of total CO2 emis-
sions (IEA, 2019). Hence, the focus of policymakers has been directed 
towards decarbonisation of these sectors. In light of the rapid techno-
logical developments in clean energy resources, the transition towards a 
zero-carbon energy industry appears now attainable. Technological 
advances have considerably lowered the cost of distributed generators, 
which use renewable rnergy sources (RES), such as wind and solar, and 
demand-side solutions. 
As a result of cost reductions and policy support, renewable power 
generation has seen adopted at the industry and households and is a 
focal point of the EU’s agenda. Although this trend has economic and 
environmental benefits, it also imposes a challenge to the energy sector. 
For instance, the integration of RES and Distributed Generation (DG) 
capacity will lead to higher operational and capital expenditures in 
transmission and distribution networks (Cossent et al., 2011, 2009; de 
Joode et al., 2009; Lo Schiavo et al., 2013). Moreover, economic and 
regulatory aspects of integrating DG into the electricity networks (and, 
recently, heat networks) need to be revised and improved (Cambini, 
2016; de Joode et al., 2010; Jenkins and P�erez-Arriaga, 2017; Peças 
Lopes et al., 2007; Strbac, 2002). 
As decarbonisation policies promote further adoption of RES gen-
eration, there is a need for an approach that supports streamlining of 
renewables integration while providing a sustainable and reliable en-
ergy system. To this end, the EU aims at encouraging the development of 
cost minimising solutions across sectors from a system perspective 
(European Commission, 2019a). By taking a holistic view of the energy 
systems to exploit the synergies between them, Energy Systems Inte-
gration (ESI) can reduce the investments required to achieve decar-
bonisation compared to a scenario in which investment planning is 
carried out separately for each network. Integration of a significant 
amounts of RES electricity and using this excess capacity to generate 
hydrogen in Power-to-Gas (P2G) facilities is an example of benefiting 
from the synergies between electricity and gas networks. Otherwise, this 
electricity would have been curtailed or stored in costly batteries. The 
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same is true between heat and electricity networks in centralised or local 
Power-to-Heat (P2H) and Pumped Heat Electrical Storage (PHES). 
Future decarbonisation plans in these energy networks, as it is on the 
EU’s agenda, cannot be achived without considering shared techno-
logical potentials which can significantly reduce the cost of the shift 
towards a zero-carbon future. These solutions can be more cost-effective 
than traditional capital-intensive solutions such as grid expansions and 
reinforcements. 
Such synergies are not only found in the energy sector but also be-
tween energy, telecommunications, transport, and even other sectors. A 
cost-effective decarbonised transport sector requires planning of a cost- 
effective electricity infrastructure within the transport network to inte-
grate Electric Vehicles (EVs) and other electrified means of trans-
portation. This is needed for a reliable electricity network that is not 
bearing the costly flexibility issues on its distribution and transmission 
networks due to coupling with other energy networks and the integra-
tion of storage and conversion technologies. 
In addition, digitalisation is creating new possibilities to speed up the 
energy transition and evolution of a spectrum to easily manage inte-
grated energy and transport sectors. Examples of the role of the Infor-
mation and Communication Technology (ICT) sector include demand 
response programmes which help balancing of energy demand and 
supply and the use of blockchain technology to improve communication 
among the grid users. 
Integration, also called sector coupling, is recognised as a strategic 
means to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 in the 
new European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019b), signed by 
the European Commission in December 2019 and supported by the 
European Parliament in January 2020. The key role of ESI in the EU’s 
future energy sector is evidenced by the Ten-Year Network Development 
Plan (TYNDP) jointly prepared by the European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) (ENTSOG 
and ENTSO-E, 2019). The scenarios described in the TYNDP will be used 
in Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to identify European transmission and 
storage infrastructure projects that are crucial for the development of 
the European energy market integration. 
ESI benefits from technological developments in the information and 
communication sector as well as in Energy Storage Systems (ESS) and 
conversion technologies to improve flexibility and reliability of energy 
systems while reducing the overall costs. In addition to technical ad-
vancements, implementing ESI requires coordinated system develop-
ment policies and regulatory frameworks. However, the existing 
literature has almost exclusively addressed ESI from the technological 
and business-model dimensions. 
This paper recognises the importance of these aspects, and provides 
an economic overview of the abovementioned technologies as well as 
discussing their role within an integrated energy system. The case for ESI 
stems from the economics of the energy sector, and the relevance of 
technology lies in its ability to shape and affect them. Regulation has a 
role in guiding this process while overcoming the barriers related to the 
structure of the industry. For this to be achieved, regulation needs to 
keep up with technological progress and the evolving needs of the en-
ergy system. This implies an improved coordination/cooperation be-
tween current sector-specific regulators and the deployment of a 
systemic view that might be attained through multi-sector regulation 
(Jamasb and Llorca, 2019). These subjects, contrary to the technical 
aspects of ESI, have not been explored adequately in the literature. The 
main contribution of this study is to identify and discuss regulatory and 
policy barriers towards the attainment of ESI and make recommenda-
tions to overcome these barriers. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
concept of ESI. Section 3 is an overview of the technologies that facili-
tate the implementation of ESI. Section 4 presents an overview of con-
ventional and most recent regulatory frameworks with respect to their 
approach towards innovation. Section 5 reviews the state of efforts in 
four major EU countries to foster network innovation, from a regulatory 
and investment perspective. Section 6 analyses economic and regulatory 
barriers towards ESI implementation. Section 7 discusses policy impli-
cations and presents conclusions. 
2. Energy Systems Integration 
ESI is an emerging paradigm which proposes a holistic view of the 
energy systems, rather than a perspective based on single segments (i.e., 
generation, transmission, distribution, retail) within a specific sector (i. 
e., electricity, gas, heat). The goal is to reduce total system costs while 
contributing to achieving a clean, affordable, and secure energy system. 
The rationale behind ESI is the existence of synergies within and be-
tween energy sectors that can provide efficiency gains. These are 
attributable to vertical and horizontal economies of scope and to the 
possibility of lowering transaction costs between grid users. While some 
of these synergies have always characterised the structure of the energy 
system, others are now emerging due to technological progress. 
The reforms that started in the 1990s led to the unbundling of 
vertically integrated utilities and to splitting them into competitive and 
regulated segments. As a result, transmission and distribution segments 
became subject to economic regulation to maximise social welfare.1 As 
discussed by Jamasb and Llorca (2019), prior to the reforms, the vertical 
structure of network utilities enabled them to benefit from economies of 
scope. Gugler et al. (2017) estimate the cost savings due to vertical 
integration of transmission and generation in medium-sized utilities to 
be about 13%, with higher cost savings for larger firms. This cost 
reduction was the result of the common usage of inputs and of infor-
mation and risk-sharing (Gugler et al., 2017). The rationale for unbun-
dling was to exert competitive pressure on generation and retail 
segments, deeming that this positive effect would offset the synergies 
loss. 
In recent years, the energy sector has rapidly changed from being 
purely efficiency-oriented to emphasise also environmental sustain-
ability. EU countries have committed to cut CO2 emissions to address 
climate change concerns. This has led to the adoption of RES generation, 
and a shift from a model with centralised generation and unidirectional 
power flows to one with distributed generation and bidirectional power 
flows. This transformation carries new challenges, mainly attributable to 
the non-dispatchability of renewables due to their intermittent nature. 
This makes it harder to balance electricity demand and supply. When 
peaks in electricity production occur, and the load cannot follow gen-
eration, curtailment of generators becomes necessary. Contrary, the use 
of conventional backup capacity (e.g., fossil fuels) is needed in the 
opposite scenario. DNV GL (2014) estimated that – without further in-
vestments in network capacity – more than 100 TWh of renewable en-
ergy will be curtailed per year by 2030. Cost-efficient integration of RES 
thus requires substantial investments in infrastructure for network 
expansion and for the installation of backup generation. 
Although the need for investments cannot be avoided, regulators 
across Europe recognise that system flexibility can help reach a cost- 
efficient outcome.2 While traditionally flexibility has been provided by 
matching generation to demand, new technologies offer flexibility by 
targeting both supply and demand. Demand Response (DR) can help 
consumers through price signals and match demand and supply. Energy 
storage – such as Electric Batteries (EBs) and Plug-in Electric Vehicles 
(PEVs) – and conversion systems – such as Combined Heat and Power 
(CHP) or Power to Gas (P2G) – allow storing energy when production 
exceeds demand. DG can help minimise transport costs and network 
1 These possess natural monopoly characteristics and therefore are required 
to be regulated. 
2 Ofgem defines flexibility as “modifying generation and/or consumption pat-
terns in reaction to an external signal (such as a change in price) to provide a service 
within the energy system” (Ofgem, 2013, para. 4). 
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losses by consuming energy closer to where it is produced. These tech-
nologies exploit synergies within and across energy sectors by enhancing 
coordination among stakeholders. 
In order to identify and exploit these synergies, there is a need for a 
comprehensive outlook that encompasses all energy systems. Current 
discussions on viewing electricity distribution and transmission net-
works as a whole suggest that treating these networks with a whole 
system approach3 (CEER, 2018) can provide further reliability and ef-
ficiency. However, this approach does not allow taking advantage of the 
synergies that exist between different energy systems since the focus is 
on the electricity sector. The ESI paradigm looks at how economies of 
scope and coordination as well as the synergies between energy net-
works, including electricity, gas, and heat, can provide an energy system 
that is clean, secure, and affordable. 
Fig. 1 represents an integrated electricity, gas, and heat energy 
system. 
With enabling technologies such as storage and conversion systems 
acting as the interfaces between networks, integration of energy net-
works can occur both at horizontal and vertical level. This integration 
can be organisational, operational or physical, and it can involve 
different stakeholders (generators, network operators, retailers, con-
sumers) within and across sectors. More specifically: 
� From an organisational point of view, it implies a bundling of ac-
tivities, previously performed by different actors, under a single 
entity, to take advantage of economies of scope. An example, at 
vertical level, is self-consumption, where consumer and generator 
coincide. At horizontal level, this could result in the emergence of 
multi-utilities, that is, utilities which operate in different sectors, 
such as electricity, gas and heating. A further example is given by 
generators that operate in different markets, such as CHP generators.  
� From an operational point of view, it works by providing interfaces 
that help lower transaction costs and increase coordination between 
operators. An example at vertical level is the use of EBs to offer 
ancillary services. At a horizontal level, we could have flexibility 
providers who use conversion technologies as P2G. 
� From a physical point of view, it can mean cross-sectoral infra-
structure planning (such as the scenarios described by the TYNDPs) 
in order to reduce total investment and operating costs. 
ESI is a combination of different types of integration. Due to the wide 
scope of ESI solutions, there is no specific single or optimal solution that 
can be recommended when adopting it. In fact, energy systems are 
idiosyncratic: path dependency and the need to consider local concerns, 
resources, and political agendas are likely to cause each country – and 
even different regions within a country – to require different ESI solu-
tions. There is, therefore, a need for bespoke approaches that take into 
consideration these peculiarities and provide context-specific frame-
work. Furthermore, Jamasb and Llorca (2019) point out to dynamic 
aspect of ESI and that it needs to coevolve with the energy system. 
As in the case of RES generation and DG, technological progress can 
lead to changes in the structure of the energy industry, the appearance of 
new players and the emergence of new opportunities. Moreover, the 
boundary between markets and regulation is not fixed: although tech-
nological advances can shift its position, regulators also have a role in 
deciding it (Jamasb and Llorca, 2019). ESI needs to be able to recognise 
these changes to find and exploit new synergies were they to occur. 
3. Technologies for ESI 
The role of integrated technologies is recognised in the literature. 
Badami and Fambri (2019) propose a methodological approach for 
analysing the synergies between different energy networks to cope with 
increasing RES penetration by using flexibility-enhancing technologies. 
Brown et al. (2018) propose a cross-sector and cross-border energy 
model of Europe to estimate the economic effect of flexibility options 
(energy conversion and storage) and cross-border transmission in a 
scenario where CO2 emissions are reduced by 95% compared to 1990 
levels. They find that the flexibility option leads to a reduction in total 
system costs of 28%, while cross-border transmission system cost saving 
is 25%. 
Rather than analysing these technologies from a technical viewpoint, 
this section discusses the role they can play in ESI, their economic 
dimension, and their economic impact. We classify these technologies in 
three categories: ICT, storage systems, and conversion technologies. 
3.1. Information and Communication Technology 
ICT transforms the way energy networks interact with each other and 
with other network industries, such as the telecommunication and 
transportation sectors. Rapid technological development in the ICT 
sector facilitates the transition towards a low carbon energy system as 
well as the exploitation of the synergies that exist within and between 
energy systems. In fact, it is through ICT that grid user coordination, 
active participation of consumers, smart network management, and 
synchronisation between multiple energy networks become possible. 
ICT is a core component of ESI, as it allows the collection of gener-
ation and consumption data that can be used to balance supply and 
demand within a network and to enhance the stability of the energy 
system. In addition, ICT facilitates the coordination and data exchanges 
within and between energy networks, which leads to lower transaction 
costs and more efficient network management. Furthermore, a better- 
synchronised energy system enables the use of conversion technolo-
gies and allows a price-driven choice of the energy mix, which increases 
the affordability of the system as a whole. This, together with infor-
mation transparency provided by ICT, can increase competition and 
emergence of new business models in the energy industry (Jamasb and 
Llorca, 2019). 
Improved communication between grid users is required to facilitate 
Fig. 1. Integration between the energy networks.  
3 Through a Whole System Approach (WSA), Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs) are required to take into account the benefits of other DSOs and 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) when they plan their investments. This 
will require improved coordination between DSOs and TSOs as well as a holistic 
view of the electricity network rather than focusing on one segment (CEER, 
2018). 
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the integration of DR,4 DG, and, more recently, ESS and PEVs. DR and 
DG, in particular, are recognised by the EU in article 14/7 2003/54/EC 
of the electricity directive and later in Directive (2009)/72/EC to be an 
alternative to the installation of new network capacity that is required to 
meet additional demand (European Parliament, 2009, 2003). In elec-
tricity networks, communication between grid users is carried out 
through Smart Grids (SGs).5 The diffusion of SGs in the EU has been 
analysed in detail by Cambini et al. (2016b). The study investigates the 
regulatory factors affecting SG investments in Europe using a dataset of 
459 innovative SG projects. They show that incentive-based regulatory 
schemes and the adoption of innovation-stimulus mechanisms are key 
enablers of SG investments. Although SGs require significant capital 
expenditures, innovation in the field of ICT can reduce the cost of its 
enabling components (e.g., voltage regulators, feeder switches, capac-
itor banks). DG INFSO (2009) points out how standardisation can play a 
role in decreasing the cost of SGs. 
Moreover, the use of ICT can provide further benefits in terms of new 
services to the grid. Through the use of blockchain technology, ICT al-
lows to address the issues of grid security, privacy, and trust (Mollah 
et al., 2019). Emerging 5G networks and 5G-based Internet of Things 
could be key enablers of DR thanks to 5G’s high transfer speed, reli-
ability, security, low power consumption, and the vast number of con-
nections (Hui et al., 2020). 
3.2. Energy storage technologies 
Energy storage is a multi-faceted concept and can be provided 
through several technologies. Pumped Hydro Storage (PHS) is currently 
the most utilised storage mechanism6 with a capacity equal to 3% of the 
global generation capacity (Ameli et al., 2017). Nevertheless, recent 
years have seen the emergence of alternative technologies, mainly in the 
form of EBs. Storage systems in suitable parts of the value chain can help 
to decouple supply and demand of energy. In addition, they help inte-
grate intermittent sources of energy more efficiently, which in turn can 
improve the flexibility and reliability of the energy system. Jamasb 
(2017) points out that storage technologies differ in size and type of 
services they can offer from very short-term reliability services to 
medium-term energy supplies. 
Ugarte et al. (2015) suggest that the operation of storage systems can 
be classified as network- or market-oriented, depending on whether, 
respectively, network operators or end-users are the beneficiaries. By 
using storage services, the RES feed-in is managed more efficiently. 
Network operators can store the excess feed-in when the demand is low 
and utilise it when a peak in consumption occurs (Ugarte et al., 2015). In 
addition, operators can use data acquired through smart meters to 
reduce network congestion and decide about further network expan-
sions considering storage capacities (VDE, 2015). Transmission opera-
tors can use storage systems to balance voltage and frequency and 
stabilise the grid. 
Li and Hedman (2015) analyse the economic impact of energy 
storage systems on the cost of conventional generators in a scenario of 
high penetration of renewable resources. They show that, with the 
deployment of storage technologies in power systems with high pene-
tration of RES, the average hourly costs for conventional generation is 
lower. They conclude that storage systems can reduce the need for 
traditional generation, which in turn lowers total system costs. 
By using SGs and the price signals they receive from retail markets, 
traditional consumers7 can decide whether to go off-grid and use private 
storage or electric vehicles as a form of a small-scale storage system or to 
stay connected to the grid. ESS can be particularly beneficial to pro-
sumers. Where regulation allows it, prosumers can store their excess 
electricity production and self-consume8 it later on to avoid both high 
volume-based and capacity-based tariffs.9 Technological progress in 
consumer electronics and – more recently – of electric mobility, is 
making storage solution considerably cheaper (BloombergNEF, 2019). 
Deployment of EBs requires large capital expenditure (Atherton 
et al., 2017), which is the main barrier to the adoption of these tech-
nologies (Bhatnagar et al., 2013). High capital cost reduces the 
competitiveness of EBs compared to other solutions that offer flexibility 
to the grid. Ameli et al. (2017) assess the impact of EBs on the operating 
cost of gas and electricity systems in Great Britain. Their results indicate 
that EBs can significantly reduce the operating costs of both systems. 
However, they argue that EBs are highly capital-intensive and only 
feasible when the capital cost is below £0.4 m/MW (and 2 MWh storage 
capacity). Despite their high capital costs, the system benefits of EBs 
could compensate for the high investments (Ameli et al., 2017). More-
over, the price of EBs is in sharp decline: 84% lower than 2010 
(BloombergNEF, 2019). Thus, other flexibility-offering technologies 
could be a complement rather than a substitute to EBs to provide extra 
benefits to the energy systems. 
Another emerging storage technology is PEVs. The expected high 
penetration of PEVs, with its possible use as a storage solution in the 
Vehicle to Grid (V2G) paradigm, has spurred the growing interest in the 
potential of distributed storage solutions. The diffusion of PEVs and the 
electrification of the transport sector will have major consequences for 
the energy system. In fact, under the assumption of bidirectional flows 
within a V2G paradigm, a scenario of high penetration of PEVs would 
imply a large amount of distributed storage, which at times could work 
as loads and at times as generators. However, Fernandez et al. (2011) 
point out that PEVs’ overall effect will be an increase in consumption, 
thus requiring an upgrade to the distribution network to enable the 
charging. Their results show that, in a scenario with 60% EV penetration 
and depending on the charging strategies, investment costs for distri-
bution operators could increase up to 15%, and energy losses in off-peak 
hours could increase up to 40%. 
3.3. Conversion systems 
Conversion technologies can increase the flexibility of the energy 
systems. They boost the degree of substitutability between energy 
sources and allow to decouple demand and supply by converting elec-
tricity into other energy sources that can then be consumed later, thus 
acting as a form of storage. This can lead to a more affordable energy 
system, as the need for backup generation capacity is reduced, and end- 
users can choose their energy mix more efficiently based on energy 
4 DR aims at changing the shape of the load curve by allowing consumers to 
adapt their consumption through price signals. Deployment of DR requires 
advanced metering infrastructures, which are currently being rolled out in the 
EU countries and are expected to be available to over 70% of customers by 2020 
(European Commission, 2014). DNV GL (2014) estimates that more effective 
use of DR in the EU can lead to annual savings of between €60 and €100 billion. 
In addition, it allows consumers to become active network users and enjoy 
financial benefits by adjusting their consumption in response to changes in the 
energy price.  
5 The European Commission defines a smart grid as “an electricity network that 
can cost efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – 
generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to ensure economically 
efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high levels of quality and 
security of supply and safety” (DG ENER, 2011, p.2). 
6 According to the World Energy Council, PHS accounts for over 95% of to-
day’s energy storage (World Energy Council, 2016). 
7 By traditional consumers we refer to users who have not installed small- 
scale DG such as Photovoltaic (PV) systems and depend entirely on the grid 
for their electricity demand. 
8 Storage could increase the percentage of self-consumption of locally pro-
duced power from some 30% to 65–75% for households (European Commis-
sion, 2015).  
9 For peak load shaving purposes, capacity-based network tariffs can be used 
as an incentive to encourage self-consumption and use of storage by prosumers. 
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market prices. 
While conversion systems are promising, their adoption will depend 
on whether technological progress can overcome two barriers: high in-
vestment costs and conversion efficiency. We focus on some already 
adopted technologies, such as Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and 
local power or gas to heat, and some emerging ones, such as Power to 
Gas (P2G). CHP enables the production of electricity and heat from gas 
while providing significant energy savings (up to 40%) and high con-
version efficiency (60–85% depending on the power to heat ratio) 
(Brodecki et al., 2014). This technology is widely adopted in the EU, 
covering, in 2017, 11% of total electricity generation (Eurostat, 2020). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that increased use of 
CHP can reduce investments in the power sector while cutting CO2 
emissions, leading to a reduction in global power sector capital cost of 
7% by 2030 (Kerr, 2008). 
When located close to final users, CHP can be used in District Heating 
(DH) networks to minimise inefficiencies by producing power and heat 
on-site. This limits network losses while using the residual heat that 
would be wasted by traditional thermal plants. Colmenar-Santos et al. 
(2016) assess the implications of substituting conventional thermal 
plants with CHP coupled with DH networks in the EU. They find that, 
with an annual investment of €300 billion, a reduction in fuel expenses 
of €100 billion per year and a 15% reduction of the final energy con-
sumption can be achieved. These figures reflect the efficient but 
capital-intensive nature of the technology. 
Local power and gas-to-heat refer to traditional and hybrid heat 
pumps, electric heaters, gas boilers and all other small-scale conversion 
technologies that can provide heating and cooling in the absence of DH. 
The aggregation and coordination of the loads of these appliances 
through SGs and DR programmes can act as a form of virtual energy 
storage, increasing flexibility and providing ancillary services to the 
networks (Cheng et al., 2017; Martin Almenta et al., 2016). Further-
more, the presence of hybrid appliances such as hybrid heat pumps al-
lows end-users to make more efficient decisions when choosing the 
energy mix, considering price and technical aspects (e.g., outdoor 
temperature). 
P2G allows the conversion of electricity into hydrogen or synthetic 
natural gas (e.g., methane). This technology could bring high flexibility 
to the energy system by absorbing the excess production of RES that 
would otherwise be curtailed when demand is low. This energy could be 
stored as gas for later consumption at peak demand times. P2G can play 
an important role in the integration of RES since gas is easier to transport 
and store than electricity and offers the largest long-term energy storage 
capacity. 
Although a variety of pilot projects are being run, this technology has 
yet to see adoption. Several technical studies have assessed cost- 
efficiency of P2G, with sometimes contradictory results. Baumann 
et al. (2013) and Budny et al. (2015) show that P2G is not economically 
viable at present and could remain so in the near future. Budny et al. 
(2015) state that, for P2G to be sustainable, high feed-in tariffs of €100 
per MW for hydrogen and €130 per MW for methane would be needed. 
Schiebahn et al. (2015) point out how renewable hydrogen, as a fuel for 
fuel cell electric vehicles, could make P2G cost-efficient. Adoption of 
P2G will ultimately depend on further progress to increase efficiency 
and reduce capital expenditures, and on the relative price of electricity 
compared to hydrogen and methane. 
As can be seen, techno-economic studies suggest that the above- 
discussed technologies can provide benefits to various parts of the en-
ergy systems through cost savings or by providing flexibility options. 
However, the literature also suggests that these technologies are, in 
general, still costly. Their development requires either significant in-
vestments by end-users and large-scale service providers to operate 
them or large investments by system operators to accommodate them 
into the networks. In this context, regulation can play an important role 
to incentivise the adoption of these new technologies. Since TSOs and 
DSOs are firms, whether they invest in innovative technologies or adopt 
them is directly impacted by regulations and policies in place regarding 
innovation. 
4. Economic regulation in ESI 
New technologies and innovative projects are a central enabler of 
ESI. While new technologies assist in achieving social objectives, as 
mentioned in Section 3, by nature, innovation is both costly and risky. In 
this context, regulation should encourage network operators to increase 
their investment in R&D projects by providing them with monetary in-
centives. However, since the energy sector reforms of 1990s, the regu-
latory efforts have been focused on improving the efficiency of the 
utilities as well as service quality rather than stimulating innovation 
(Agrell et al., 2013; Cambini et al., 2016a; Joskow, 2014; Meeus and 
Saguan, 2011; Müller, 2011). As a result, regulatory approaches tend to 
emphasise the reduction of operational costs to achieve efficiency while 
allowing the pass-through of capital expenditures. 
Although the cost of innovation in the electricity sector is high, in-
vestments in conventional technologies are more capital-intensive. 
Thus, under a regulatory scheme that allows the pass-through of capi-
tal costs, utilities tend to invest in more capital-intensive solutions 
(Meeus and Saguan, 2011) rather than less costly but risky innovative 
technologies. Nykamp et al. (2012) and Prüggler and Bremberger (2011) 
show how such an outcome is currently observable in Germany and 
Austria. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding the successful outcome of 
any kind of innovation or R&D activity is an obstacle that forces utilities 
to act with caution when deciding whether to invest in new technolo-
gies, including the ones enabling ESI. In this regard, the development 
and adoption of innovative technologies require support from policy-
makers as well as sound regulatory frameworks that provide monetary 
incentives to stimulate innovation. 
In practice, standard regulatory approaches such as cost of service 
(rate-of-return) and fixed-price (incentive) regulations do not provide 
utilities with enough incentives to invest in innovative projects (Bau-
knecht, 2011). As conventional regulatory approaches fail to provide 
incentives for innovation and investment in energy networks, innovative 
regulatory frameworks should be developed. So far, the solution has 
been to devise hybrid regulatory frameworks that take a different 
approach towards R&D costs compared to other network expenditures 
(Bauknecht and Brunekreeft, 2008). Bauknecht (2011) discusses in 
detail innovative regulatory approaches towards innovation, including 
input- and output-based incentive mechanisms, as well as hybrid ap-
proaches that combine the traditional ones. 
In particular, output-based mechanisms are relatively new in the 
regulation of energy utilities. They focus on improving the performance 
of the utilities with regards to the quality of their services as well as the 
desired sustainability targets. Regarding innovation, in contrast to 
input-based mechanisms, which focus on minimising production costs, 
output-based models focus on the outcomes of innovation (Bauknecht, 
2011). However, defining the outputs to be incentivised is complex, and 
requires detailed information regarding the results of the innovative 
projects, as well as extensive budget and skills on the regulator’s side 
(Glachant et al., 2013). 
Although output-based mechanisms are successful in encouraging 
the utilities to increase investment in innovative solutions, defining 
successful innovation is as hard as separating the cost of innovation from 
other costs in the input-based mechanisms. Therefore, designing a reg-
ulatory framework which is both reliable in promoting innovation and 
easy to implement will be a challenging endeavour for regulators. For 
these reasons, regulatory authorities around the world apply a combi-
nation of these mechanisms to promote innovation in the energy net-
works while improving their overall efficiency. 
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5. Evidence from selected EU countries 
In the previous sections, we emphasised the importance of techno-
logical and regulatory solutions to achieve ESI. In this section, we pro-
vide a summary of the regulatory frameworks that are being used 
around Europe to foster network innovation (including ESI). In partic-
ular, we look at the regulatory schemes in the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, France, and Italy, with a focus on the incentives they provide for 
the adoption of innovative solutions in electricity and gas sectors. 
Table 1 summarises the current regulatory scenario in those countries. 
The UK has been the most proactive country in fostering innovation 
through regulation through the RIIO (Revenue ¼ Incentives þ Innova-
tion þ Outputs) (Ofgem, 2010) regulatory framework. RIIO offers an 
innovation stimulus for each network, consisting of three measures: the 
Network Innovation Allowance (NIA),10 the Network Innovation 
Competition (NIC),11 and the Innovation Roll-out Mechanism (IRM). To 
provide an insight on the quantitative impact of the innovation stimuli, 
we categorised – based on the technological domain – the projects that 
started between RIIO’s introduction in 2013 and September 2018, with 
a budget over £1 million and which have been financed under NIA and 
NIC. The 118 projects make up for almost 75% of the overall NIA and 
NIC budgets. Seven categories have been used, with each project being 
assigned to a single group – the most relevant one – even in the case in 
which its scope would encompass more than one. The findings are re-
ported in Table 2. 12 
Innovation in the UK has been mainly regulation-driven. However, 
other countries have taken different approaches. In Germany incentives 
to R&D and adoption of new technologies are mainly provided under 
large ministerial programmes funded by the Federal Government to 
reflect the national energy policy (BMWi, 2018), leaving the regulator 
with a limited role in this regard. France and Italy, on the other hand, 
have taken a hybrid approach: incentives are provided through adjust-
ments by the regulator to the revenue allowance as well as grants given 
under EUand national programmes. Table 3 categorises network inno-
vation projects being performed in these countries by TSOs and DSOs as 
well as their funding resources and allocated budgets. Appendix A 
provides sources on analysed projects. 
Although our overview does not claim to be exhaustive due to the 
difficulty of acquiring data on investments in innovation, what emerges 
is a lack of investment in ESI. Even investments in ESI-enabling tech-
nologies do not seem high enough to keep up with EU decarbonisation 
targets. 
6. Economic and policy barriers 
The lack of investment in ESI can be explained by the existence of 
different economic and policy barriers to its adoption. While some of 
these will disappear naturally as technology advances, direct policy 
actions are required to address most of them. 
The first economic barrier is the cost of ESI-enabling technologies. 
Some of these technologies are capital-intensive, such as CHP. Others 
are costly because they are at the beginning of their lifecycle, and the 
cost of investment could significantly decrease once their adoption in-
creases, as it is happening with EBs. A high cost of adoption is an 
important concern, particularly for final users. 
The second barrier is the intrinsic risk of these innovative projects, 
both in term of the economic viability of in-development technologies 
(e.g., P2G) and in terms of consumer acceptance (e.g., DR). The risk- 
averse nature of firms in the energy sector can be a strong limiting 
factor in fostering the adoption of these technologies. 
The third barrier is the institutional constraints in incentivising the 
adoption of innovative technologies when the existing regulatory 
framework calls for a technology-neutral approach. The Directorate- 
General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission 
suggests that incentives to innovation should not favour one technology 
to another (DG COMP, 2013). Technology-neutrality will allow the 
market to select the ‘best’ innovative solution to adopt without further 
interventions from the regulator (CEER, 2018). However, as noted by 
DG-COMP (2013), technology-neutrality should not lead to the adoption 
of cheaper and mature solutions while postponing investments in more 
costly but promising technologies. 
The fourth barrier is the coordination between grid users (i.e., gen-
erators, TSOs, DSOs, retailers, consumers), and especially TSOs and 
DSOs. For the delivery of a clean and reliable energy system at the lowest 
total cost, ESI requires grid users to provide the service that minimises 
the overall system cost. However, this may not be optimal for some 
users, who may lack incentive to adopt it. This is particularly true for 
DSOs. The integration of DG has led to higher operational expenditures 
for DSOs due to the greater complexity arising from managing a two- 
way system and from the capital expenditure of the DG connection. 
The diffusion of PEVs will make the loads less predictable and will 
require major investments in the grid. Conversion and storage systems 
will also enhance the complexity of managing the distribution network. 
DR and DG contribute to load shaving and load shifting. By doing so they 
reduce or defer the need for costly network reinforcement investments 
and thus improve cost efficiency of the networks. 
Aside from this, coordination in itself can be costly as it requires 
interaction within and between sectors. The problem of coordination is 
not exclusive to the interactions between different energy systems. With 
the increasing penetration of PEVs, the integration of electricity and 
transportation networks is challenging for both energy and trans-
portation regulators. A focal concern is the tariff design and charging 
mechanisms, with a specific call for decoupling which guarantees to 
utilities constant revenues and profits regardless of how much energy 
they deliver (Abrardi and Cambini, 2015; Brennan, 2013). In addition, 
establishing who and how should finance, construct, and operate 
charging infrastructures is an unsolved challenge. The question of 
whether DSOs should play a role in the roll-out of PEV charging in-
frastructures is currently debated across the European Union (Wargers 
et al., 2018). 
The fifth barrier is access to data. An efficient communication stream 
facilitates coordination between upstream and downstream grid users 
within and between networks. Smart meters and smart grids can collect 
data on the state of the grid and on user consumption. These data need to 
be accessible for new business models to emerge and to allow optimi-
sation throughout the energy system. Distinguishing between these 
types of data is important from a privacy perspective, as users’ con-
sumption data are personal and subject to strict legal rules for their 
access. In both cases, the user that controls these data may not have 
incentives or even the legal possibilities to share them with other grid 
users. DSOs may not wish to share detailed information on the state of 
the grid with other parties (e.g., TSO or aggregators). Consumers may 
not wish to disclose detailed data regarding their consumptions and the 
appliances they have installed to a distributor that could use them to 
perform DR as it can be perceived as a privacy intrusion. 
10 The NIA is an annual allowance for network licensees to fund small R&D 
and demonstration projects. This allowance is added to the base revenue when 
determining the annual amount that the licensee can recover from its cus-
tomers. The Authority decides on the project approval only on special cir-
cumstances, otherwise it is automatic once it is disclosed through an 
appropriate website. Up to 2017, about £60 m were made available annually 
through the NIA (Ofgem, 2017).  
11 The NIC is an annual competitive process run to finance a selected amount 
of large development and demonstration projects. For each sector, transmission 
and distribution operators compete for funding. NIC provides up to £70 m per 
year for electricity networks and £20 m per year for gas networks and funds up 
to 90% of a project’s total budget, forcing operators to bear some of its cost. Up 
to September 2018, about £200 m have been granted (Ofgem, 2017).  
12 Network operators have the obligation to disclose data on NIC and NIA 
projects on the Smarter Networks portal to help disseminate knowledge. The 
portal can be reached at http://www.smarternetworks.org/(ENA). 
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The sixth barrier is consumer acceptance. We mentioned the possi-
bility of consumers being against the collection of their data and diffu-
sion of technologies deemed intrusive. However, consumers may also 
resist to investments in innovation that leads to higher tariffs. The risky 
nature of innovative projects makes so that blindly funding innovation 
spending is not viable, since this may be costly compared to the benefits 
gained from innovation. These investments need to be assessed while 
having in mind potential consumer gains, both in term of economic 
returns and environmental gains. Furthermore, although integrating 
RES and DG in an ESI scenario leads to lower system costs, it still re-
quires large investments in the networks compared to a situation where 
no action is undertaken. This can lead to consumers’ resistance to 
innovation in the energy networks in a case where the costs are passed 
entirely to them. 
The seventh barrier relates to the role of the regulator. The regulator 
should define the boundary between regulated activities and the market. 
For instance, while the penetration of EVs significantly impacts DSOs’ 
operation (Wargers et al., 2018), there remains ambiguity regarding 
whether to involve DSOs in the roll-out of PEVs. Another example is in 
the differences in the approaches by the European regulators on whether 
to allow DSOs to own and operate storage systems. The matter is delicate 
due to the risk of having a monopolist operating in a potentially 
competitive market. While in Norway DSOs can own and operate ESS, in 
the UK storage is classified as generation, and therefore DSOs can own, 
but only third parties can operate it due to unbundling constraints 
(CEER, 2019). In Italy, the regulator allows DSOs to invest in storage 
systems, but this investment cannot be recovered through distribution 
tariffs unless it is justified through a cost-benefit analysis (CEER, 2019). 
The lack of a clear and uniform policy regarding what network operators 
are allowed to do can influence the emergence of new players, new 
business models and the adoption of ESI-enabling technologies. 
The eighth barrier is the behaviour of prosumers behind-the-meter. 
Further diffusion of DG and storage systems can lead to a scenario of 
increasing independence of prosumers from the grid. These users may 
rely less and less on the network as their share of self-consumption in-
creases. By consuming less energy from the grid, they contribute less to 
the operation, maintenance, and expansion of the infrastructure. These 
costs are covered through network charges, which constitute part of the 
final energy price charged to consumers. With fewer consumers paying 
network charges, and with these costs being mainly fixed, the final price 
of energy could raise significantly. This, in turn, would make leaving the 
grid more appealing, which could create a self-sustaining cycle that 
would leave consumers who cannot adopt DG and storage with an 
Table 1 
An overview of policies to foster network innovation in four EU countries.   
United Kingdom Germany France Italy 
Type of regulation Revenue cap with output, efficiency 
and innovation incentives 
Revenue cap with expansion 
incentives 
Hybrid: revenue cap with cost of 
service elements. Efficiency 
incentives 
Hybrid: revenue cap with cost of 




8 years 5 years 4 years 8 years (electricity), 
4 years (gas) 
Innovation incentives Innovation stimulus packages: 
adjustments to revenue allowance and 
competition for funding 
50% cost recovery for innovative 
projects that fall under ministerial 
funding programmes 
Full cost recovery for innovative 
projects approved by the 
regulator 
WACC mark-up for innovative 
projects 
Costs added to RAB 
(Regulatory Asset 
Base) 
Capex and Opex Capex and Opex Capex Capex 
Innovation funding Regulation-based Government-based: grants given 
under ministerial funding 
programmes 
Hybrid: regulation, 
government, and EU-based 
Hybrid: regulation, 
government, and EU-based  
Table 2 







Network Managementa 62 325.4 5.2 
Low carbon technologies and energy 
efficiency 
7 56.1 8.0 
EV and hydrogen vehicles 5 11.0 2.2 
Smart Grids 13 65.5 5.0 
Storage systems 2 2.9 1.4 
Energy systems integration 1 5.2 5.2 
Others 28 85.9 3.1 
Total 118 552.1 4.7 
Source: Elaboration on data available from the Smarter Networks portal. 
a This category comprises technologies that improve network reliability, 
control, safety, and service quality. 
Table 3 
Overview of network innovation projects in Germany, France and Italy.  
Country Germany France Italy 
Project 
category 
























TSO and DSO Increase in network 
tariffs (þ2% WACC 




















TSO and DSO Increase in metering 
tariffs (þ2% WACC 




Low-interest loans by 
Government-owned 
development bank 
€80 million Consumers 
Conversion Increase in network 
tariffs (Surcharge to 
electricity from CHP) 
Max annual 
fund of €1.5 
billion 




TSO – – – 
Source: See Appendix A for a detailed list of analysed projects. 
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unsustainably expensive energy system (Jamasb, 2017). 
The final policy barrier is whether the European regulators have the 
resources and disposition to intervene on the whole energy system 
cohesively. Typically, energy sectors have been regulated separately 
from one another, and regulatory decisions regarding economic activ-
ities within each energy network are taken independently. This may lead 
to overspecialisation and a lack of holistic view, which is a strong 
requirement for ESI to be successful. In particular, this sector-specific 
approach may deprive investment in those innovative technologies 
that calls for an integrated view as required within the ESI paradigm. 
7. Conclusion and policy implications 
ESI can be an effective way to integrate RES and DG while providing 
a reliable and affordable energy system. However, the implementation 
of this paradigm and the improved coordination between different en-
ergy systems requires not only the adoption of innovative technologies 
but also new policies and regulation. This Section discusses the main 
policy interventions needed to enable ESI. With this aim, Table 4 lists the 
barriers identified in Section 6, together with potential policy solutions. 
We discuss in detail each policy solution in the following. 
7.1. Innovation incentives 
ESI requires investment in new technologies, and network operators 
are naturally positioned to lead the process. Therefore, regulatory 
frameworks should incentivise investments by networks in innovation. 
The implementation of output-based incentive regulation is well suited 
for this goal, as it shifts the focus from economic efficiency to an efficient 
delivery of outputs specified by the regulator. Regulators should 
recognise that, due to asymmetry of information, firms are better posi-
tioned to know the best ways to deliver an output, meaning which 
technology will work best and at the lowest cost. Therefore, firms should 
be required to take on an active role in determining how to deliver 
outputs (Ofgem, 2010). On the other hand, clear output specification is 
needed to avoid opportunistic behaviour or short term focus, which may 
lead firms to choose sub-optimal investment solutions. Gaining the 
know-how to calibrate outputs will inevitably require a trial-and-error 
approach by regulators. However, looking at countries that are adopt-
ing output-based incentive regulation (e.g., the UK) can provide useful 
guidance. 
Adopting a Totex approach is another important step in incentivising 
innovation. Traditionally, regulatory frameworks have treated capital 
(Capex) and operational expenditures (Opex) differently: by adding 
Capex to the RAB, they introduce a bias to Capex-heavy investments. 
However, ESI-enabling technologies provide flexibility to the grid: they 
reduce the need for investments in grid and generation capacity, but 
they create a more complex network. Therefore, they cause a rise in 
Opex that is more than offset by the reduction in Capex. If a bias to 
Capex is present, firms could prefer to invest in costly Capex-heavy so-
lutions. The Totex approach considers both Capex and Opex, thus 
eliminating the incentive to favour capital intensive investments. This 
approach, pioneered by the UK, is being followed by other EU countries 
such as Italy (AEEGSI, 2017) and, in a narrower scope, France (CRE, 
2018). 
Network innovation also needs to be fostered through specific in-
centives, as they lower the risk the regulated firm bears. In this regard, 
the regulator can take two approaches: to fix the revenue allowance and 
the expected result of the innovation process beforehand, or to fix the 
revenue allowance for innovation but leave network firms with the 
freedom to decide how to spend it. The Italian and French energy au-
thorities take the first approach. In Italy, the regulator chooses which SG 
projects should be financed and awards them with an extra capital 
remuneration. In France, the regulator approves or rejects the innova-
tion plan and budget of each network firm for the regulatory period. 
The UK uses both approaches. With the Network Innovation 
Competition, the regulator decides which projects to finance and by how 
much. On the other hand, through the Network Innovation Allowance, it 
assigns to each operator an allowance that the operator can use on 
innovation projects that do not need regulatory approval. The latter 
approach might provide the right balance of risk and remuneration at a 
stage where there is a need to invest a lot in innovation. The mixed- 
approach allows the regulator to guarantee the affordability of innova-
tion while leaving firms with the flexibility to suggest new solutions. 
Furthermore, risk can be reduced by sharing the results of innovative 
projects. When investments are financed through innovation stimuli, 
regulators should impose network operators to disseminate the results of 
their innovative projects irrespective of failure or success (such an 
approach is taken both in the UK and in Italy). 
Another potential approach is to use regulatory sandboxes. This 
regulatory approach includes case-by-case exemptions for the innova-
tive projects which are constrained by specific regulatory rules (Broeckx 
et al., 2019). The regulator evaluates the projects and then defines a set 
of rules to be lifted for a certain period. Although this approach facili-
tates innovation and allows investors to develop their innovative solu-
tions with less regulatory burdens, it still needs to be carefully 
implemented. Which projects should benefit from the exemptions, how 
long should be the exemption period for each project and which actors 
should be able to implement these projects are the issues that the 
regulator should take into account upon deciding on adopting regula-
tory sandboxes. 
Finally, regulatory sandboxes are only valid when regulation does 
Table 4 
Policy solutions to barriers for ESI implementation.  


















Innovation incentives x x X       
Drive consumer 
actions 
x x    x    
Foster emergence of 
new players 
x x     x   
TSO/DSO adoption x      x   
ICT & data access  x  x x     
Incentivise 
coordination    
x x  x   
Decoupled revenues    x    x  
Cross-sector 
development plans 
x   x  x   x 
Coordination at the 
EU level 
x x x x x x x  x  
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not keep up with the technology. Regulation is, and certainly needs to 
be, evolving alongside technology. This means that current rules should 
be eventually redefined to cover technological shifts appropriately. In 
this sense, regulatory sandboxes can be considered as an attractive so-
lution to promote innovation only for a limited period during which 
regulation is lagging behind and not the solution itself. 
7.2. Drive consumer actions 
Consumers need to play an active role in ESI. Adoption of household- 
level storage systems (e.g., electric batteries) and conversion technolo-
gies (e.g., hybrid heat pumps) could be incentivised through tariff-based 
support mechanisms, like feed-in tariffs for DG, or through government 
grants or loans. The latter approach has been taken in Germany, where 
the government has provided low-interest loans through its develop-
ment bank KfW for battery storage units that are installed alongside PV 
systems. While, up to 2016, KfW has given 60 m euros in funding, this 
spurred investment of about 450 m euros (BMWi, 2017). Investment by 
private citizens can help these technologies develop towards a mature 
stage, thus lowering their cost while also reducing the burden for the 
energy system. The need for such incentives would disappear once the 
technologies are mature enough, as the savings they provide make up for 
the investment cost. While consumers benefit from these technologies 
through arbitrage, prosumers could use them to increase their 
self-consumption rate and be off-grid during peak loads. This can be 
beneficial to both prosumers (lower final electricity bills) and network 
operators (lower network costs). Consumer acceptance of more intrusive 
technologies can also be increased through appropriate price signals. DR 
could be more attractive should it lead to a lower energy bill. Detailed 
consumption disclosure could also be conditional on a reduction in the 
price of consumed energy, or to some other form of monetary incentive 
(without this exempting from the need to comply with privacy protec-
tion rules). 
7.3. Foster emergence of new players 
Aside from consumers, other grid users could benefit from tariff- 
based support mechanisms. Where markets are still not deemed 
mature, these mechanisms could help new business models to emerge. 
Flexibility providers could install storage and conversion systems to 
provide services to the grid. Through the CHP Act (BMJV, 2019a), in 
Germany, a surcharge is granted to electricity generated through CHP. 
This has been used to promote construction and modernisation of 
cogeneration plants and heat networks. By treating storage as genera-
tion, similar pricing policy as for DG can be adapted to ESS, which im-
plies diverse tariff mechanisms for importing and injecting electricity. 
7.4. TSO/DSO adoption 
Equating storage to generation has led most European regulators to 
forbid TSOs and DSOs to operate storage systems. Indeed, where the 
context could allow new grid users to provide such service, having a 
monopolist operate in a competitive market would be detrimental. 
However, since energy systems are different from one another due to 
scale, geography and a variety of other reasons, in some cases, a 
competitive market would not develop. Regulators should, under such 
conditions, allow network operators to own and operate storage and 
conversion systems. Allowing DSOs and TSOs to own and operate stor-
age can significantly reduce infrastructure costs and the need to build 
excess capacity (Ugarte et al., 2015). Similarly, operating conversion 
systems could allow network firms to take advantage of economies of 
scope. Such a scenario should not require providing firms with any 
incentive, as investing in such technologies would be advantageous for 
them due to the overall cost reduction. Allowing this type of investments 
could be a temporary measure used to increase adoption and lower the 
cost of these technologies. Once the conditions for a competitive market 
are mature, network firms could be required to divest (allowing for an 
adequate remuneration of previously invested capitals and avoiding 
regulatory opportunism). 
7.5. ICT and data access 
While ESI entails physical exchanges of energy within and between 
energy systems, it is mostly data and information exchanges that make 
the integration possible. Therefore, investments in ICTs in the form of 
smart grids and smart meters should be incentivised. Data transparency 
rules and clear third-party access policies could be used to increase co-
ordination among grid users. 
7.6. Incentivise coordination 
Coordination will also require remunerating the new services that 
network firms provide to the system. This has been recognised by the 
Italian regulator, which introduced a mitigation-service fee that the DSO 
receives from the TSO when it helps to limit the impact of interruptions 
in the transmission grid by allowing back-feeding in the distribution 
network through appropriate grid rearrangements (AEEGSI, 2015). 
Similarly, the TSO pays the DSO for having access to real-time data on 
the state of the distribution grid, which is then used by the TSO for 
balancing reasons (CEER, 2018). Some other solutions mentioned by 
Hadush and Meeus (2018) that may be helpful to address the issue of 
TSO/DSO coordination are:  
� The establishment of Independent System Operators (ISOs) for the 
joint operation of the systems in the borders between TSOs and 
DSOs.  
� Having DSOs as market facilitators, either as aggregators of the bids 
of DG in the wholesale market or limiting their role to prequalifi-
cation. DSOs would cooperate with ISOs to compute and ascertain 
the available capacity that could be allocated by the market at the 
borders between TSOs and DSOs.  
� Promoting modifications to make regulators more proactive and 
adaptative to quick changes in the sector. In that context, regulatory 
sandboxes can serve to test new approaches that might foster coor-
dination between system operators. 
7.7. Decoupled revenues 
ESI requires decoupling network firms’ revenues from energy con-
sumption. This is needed to both coordinate grid users and to ensure 
profitability for distributors, which could face increases in costs and 
reductions in revenues in an ESI scenario. DSOs could be required to 
connect DGs, conversion and storage systems, while their revenues 
would be linked to the number of connections provided. Such an 
approach is used in Germany, where DSOs’ revenue allowances are 
adjusted by an expansion factor that takes into account the amount of 
DG connected (BMJV, 2019b). As sales and consumption of energy will 
increasingly differ, system costs will make up for a higher proportion of 
the final user’s energy bill. The need to provide an affordable energy 
system for everybody will require prosumers to contribute to the 
network irrespective of self-consumption rate (Cambini and Soroush, 
2019). 
7.8. Cross-sector development plans 
Lowering system costs requires coordinated development plans for 
network operators. Network firms’ investment decisions should take 
into account the whole energy system to exploit existing synergies. 
Regulators could either require that network firms do so in their busi-
ness plans or they could raise (lower) revenue allowances for firms that 
(do not) do so. Furthermore, innovation incentives could also be con-
ditional on the fact that the innovation provides system benefits. In 
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defining the new rules for RIIO-2, the UK’s regulator Ofgem has recog-
nised the need for an integrated approach, and it expects network firms 
to provide whole system solutions in their business plans (Ofgem, 
2019a, 2019b). 
7.9. Coordination at the EU level 
As the EU has identified ESI as a priority (ENTSOG and ENTSO-E, 
2019), there is a need to ensure greater coordination at European 
level. This could be achieved by giving more leverage to the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), although its prescriptive 
power would need to be limited to recognise the peculiarities and 
different demands of each state’s energy system. The EU coordinator 
would need to engage with relevant stakeholders to identify opportu-
nities to deliver cross-country integration solutions (e.g., North Sea 
offshore grid integration). It would foster exchanges between regulators, 
disseminating best practices, and helping create regulatory know-how. 
It would also look at successful pilot projects throughout Europe to 
identify what is technologically needed by the market and to impose 
standards for the industry. Granting access to the results of network 
firms’ innovation projects would reduce risk and prevent duplication of 
effort. 
In our discussion of possible policy interventions to drive ESI, we 
refrain from providing too specific solutions. This follows from 
recognising that ESI needs to be a bespoke approach that considers the 
characteristics and needs of the systems. As the barriers its adoption may 
face will differ from case to case, so will the policies needed to overcome 
them. In our analysis, we provided a menu of possible solutions, with the 
idea that ESI can be achieved through a proper design of incentives to 
grid users. 
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Appendix A. List of Projects and Sources  
Project Name Source Country 
NIC and NIA projects http://www.smarternetworks.org/ UK 
FREEDOM http://www.smarternetworks.org/ UK 
SINTEG https://www.bmwi.de/ Germany 
Energy Storage Funding Initiative - R&D and 
demonstration of storage technologies 
https://www.bmwi.de/; https://forschung-energiespeicher.info/ Germany 
KfW Banks – loans for EBs https://www.bmwi.de/ Germany 
CHP Act https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kwkg_2016/BJNR249810015.html Germany 
WindNODE https://www.sinteg.de/; https://www.windnode.de/ Germany 
SMILE https://smile-smartgrids.fr/ France 
FlexGrid http://www.flexgrid.fr/ France 
SG pilot projects http://www.smartgrids-cre.fr/ France 
11 pilot projects in isolated networks D�elib�eration de la Commission de r�egulation de l’�energie du 4 octobre 2018 portant d�ecision sur la compensation 
des projets de stockage centralis�e dans les zones non interconnect�ees dans le cadre du guichet d’october 2017. 
France 
RINGO D�elib�eration de la Commission de R�egulation de l’Energie du 7 d�ecember 2017 portant approbation du 
programme d’investissements de RTE pour 2018. 
France 
Jupiter 1000 https://www.jupiter1000.eu/ France 
SG pilot projects https://www.arera.it/ Italy 
e-Distribuzione - SG projects https://www.e-distribuzione.it/; http://www.ponic.gov.it/ Italy 
e-Distribuzione -Open Meter project Deliberazione 6 aprile 2017–222/2017/R/EEL - Sistemi di smart metering di seconda generazione (2G): 
decisione sul piano di messa in servizio e sulla richiesta di ammissione al riconoscimento degli investimenti in 
regime specifico di e-distribuzione S.p.a. 
Italy 
Terna S.p.A. - Project Lab and Large Scale Energy 
Storage pilot projects 
http://www.terna.it/ Italy  
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